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11 Introduction
In Nash implementation theory, it is Maskin’s Theorem (Maskin, 1999) which
shows that when the planner faces at least three agents, a social choice corre-
spondence (SCC) is implementable in (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria (hence-
forth, Nash-implementable) if it satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity and no-veto
power; conversely, any Nash-implementable SCC is Maskin-monotonic. Two
issues pertaining to this theorem stand out. First, it does not provide a
complete characterization of Nash-implementable SCCs, since no-veto power
is not necessary for Nash implementation. Second, a canonical mechanism
proposed in this theorem, which requires each agent to report a preference
proﬁle, a feasible social outcome, and an integer, is not so attractive. This
is because the message space of this mechanism is rather large and announc-
ing all other agents’ preferences is undesirable in terms of the informational
eﬃciency of decentralized decision making (on this point see, for instance,
Hurwicz, 1960).
Moore and Repullo (1990) address the ﬁr s ti s s u eb yp r o v i d i n g ,w i t h o u t
any domain restriction, a necessary and suﬃcient condition, called Condition
μ, for Nash implementability of SCCs in societies with more than two agents.1
In contrast to the ﬁrst issue, the issue of informational eﬃciency is addressed
by Saijo (1988), who shows that a mechanism with strategy-space reduction
(henceforth, s-mechanism)s u ﬃces to guarantee Maskin’s Theorem. Note
that, in s-mechanisms, each agent is requested to announce, in addition to a
feasible social outcome and an integer, her own and her neighbor’s preferences
solely. Yet, as Moore and Repullo (1990) also use a canonical mechanism for
showing the full characterization and Saijo (1988) does not discuss a full
characterization of Nash implementation, it leaves unclear not only whether
Moore and Repullo’s result indispensably relies on canonical mechanisms
but also whether s-mechanisms can Nash-implement any other SCC than
Maskin-monotonic and no-veto power ones.
In this paper, we address the issue of what constitutes the necessary and
suﬃcient condition for Nash implementation by s-mechanisms. We introduce
a class of new conditions (labelled, {Condition μs
r}r=1,...,n−2)w h i c hf u l l yc h a r -
1Note that, for two person societies, Moore and Repullo (1990) and Dutta and Sen
(1991) independently provided necessary and suﬃcient conditions for Nash implemen-
tation, whereas even in societies with more than two agents, there are other works on
complete characterizations of Nash implementation under some domain restrictions, such
as Danilov (1992) and Yamato (1992).
2acterize the class of SCCs Nash-implemantable by s-mechanisms. Each of
Condition μs
r turns out to be equivalent to Condition μ. The same issue is
addressed by introducing an alternative condition, Condition Ms,w h i c hi s
similar to Condition M appeared in Sjöstrom (1991); a new characterization
of Nash-implementable SCCs via s-mechansims is provided by using Condi-
tion Ms. It is also shown that Condition Ms is equivalent to Condition μs
r
for each r =1 ,...,n−2 (and so to Condition μ). Moreover, we show that s-
mechanisms constitute the ‘lower-bound of Nash-implementing mechanisms’
in the sense that no further strategy space reduction can preserve the Moore
and Repullo (1990) full characterization of Nash implementation.
It may be worth mentioning that all of our characterization results are
obtained by restricting the class of available s-mechanisms to those satisfying
forthrightness, which is a variation of those introduced in Dutta et al. (1995),
Saijo et al. (1996), and Tatamitani (2001).2 As a result, the outcome of an
equilibrium message proﬁle of our mechanisms is ‘easy’ to compute and the
problem of information smuggling is avoided.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal envi-
ronment. Section 3 reports our main characterization result via Condition
μs
r, whereas Section 4 reports an alternative characterization result via Con-
dition Ms. Section 5 shows that the lower-bound property of s-mechanisms
to reserve Nash implementation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
The set of (social choice) environments is (N,X,Rn),w h e r eN ≡ {1,...,n}
is a set of n ≥ 3 agents, X ≡ {x,y,z,...} is the set of attainable alter-
natives (or outcomes),a n dRn is the set of admissible preference proﬁles
(or states of the world). Henceforth, we assume that the cardinality of X
is #X ≥ 2.L e t R(X) be the set of all complete preorders on X.3 We
assume that Rn ≡ R1 × ... ×R n is a non-empty subset of the n-fold Carte-
sian product Rn (X) ≡R(X) × .... ×R(X)
| {z }
n-times
.A ne l e m e n to fRn is denoted by
2Note that the forthrightness condition is indispensable for showing Theorem 1, a main
result of this paper.
3A complete preorder R ∈ R(X) is a complete and transitive binary relation. A
relation R on X is complete if, for all x,x0 ∈ X, (x,x0) ∈ R or (x0,x) ∈ R; transitive if,
for all x,x0,x 00 ∈ X,i f(x,x0) ∈ R and (x0,x 00) ∈ R ,t h e n(x,x00) ∈ R.
3R ≡ (R1,...,Rn),w h e r ei t s`-th component is R` ∈ R`,f o re a c h` ∈ N.F o r
any preference proﬁle R ∈ Rn and any ` ∈ N,l e tR−` be the list of elements
of R for all agents except `, i.e., R−` ≡ (R1,...,R`−1,R `+1,...,Rn).G i v e na
list R−` and R` ∈ R`,w ed e n o t eb y(R−`,R `) the preference proﬁle consisting
of these R` and R−`. For any preference proﬁle R ∈ Rn and any S ⊆ N,l e t
R−S b et h el i s to fe l e m e n t so fR for all agents in N\S. Given a list R−S and
RS ∈ ×`∈SR`,w ed e n o t eb y(R−S,R S) the preference proﬁle consisting of
these RS and R−S.F o ra n y(R`,x) ∈ R`×X,a g e n t`’s weakly lower contour
set of R` at x is given by L(R`,x) ≡ {y ∈ X|(x,y) ∈ R`}.F o re a c h` ∈ N
and each R` ∈ R`, maxR` X ≡ {x ∈ X|(x,y) ∈ R` for all y ∈ X}.
We also assume that N and X are ﬁxed throughout the following discus-
sion, so that the set of environments is boiled down to Rn.Asocial choice
correspondence (SCC) is a correspondence F : Rn ³ X with F (R) 6= ∅ for
all R ∈ Rn.
A mechanism (or game-form) is a pair γ ≡ (M,g),w h e r eM ≡ M1 ×
... × Mn,a n dg : M → X is the outcome function. Denote a generic mes-
sage (or strategy) for agent ` by m` ∈ M` and a generic message proﬁle
by m =( m1,...,mn) ∈ M. For any m ∈ M and ` ∈ N,l e tm−` ≡
(m1,...,m`−1,m `+1,...,mn).L e tM−` ≡ ×j∈N\{`}Mj.G i v e n m−` ∈ M−`
and m` ∈ M`,d e n o t eb y(m`,m −`) the message proﬁle consisting of these
m` and m−`. For any m ∈ M and S ⊆ N,l e tm−S ≡ (m`)`∈N\S.L e t
M−S ≡ ×j∈N\SMj.G i v e nm−S ∈ M−S and mS ∈ MS,d e n o t eb y(mS,m −S)
the message proﬁle consisting of these mS and m−S.G i v e n R ∈ Rn and
γ =( M,g),t h ep a i r(γ,R) constitutes a (non-cooperative) game.G i v e n
ag a m e(γ,R), m ∈ M is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of (γ,R) if
and only if, for all ` ∈ N, (g(m),g(m0
`,m −`)) ∈ R` for all m0
` ∈ M`.L e t
NE(γ,R) denote the set of Nash equilibria of (γ,R), whereas denote the set
of Nash equilibrium outcomes of (γ,R) by NA(γ,R) ≡ g(NE(γ,R)).
A mechanism γ =( M,g) implements F in Nash equilibria,o rs i m p l y
Nash-implements F, if and only if NA(γ,R)=F (R) for all R ∈ Rn.A n
SCC F is Nash-implementable if there is such a mechanism.
Moore and Repullo (1990) show that, under the society with more than
two agents, the following condition is the necessary and suﬃcient condition
for any SCC to be Nash-implemetable.
Condition μ (for short, μ). An SCC F satisﬁes Condition μ if there exists a
set Y ⊆ X,a n df o ra l lR ∈ Rn and for all x ∈ F (R), there is a proﬁle of sets
4(C` (R,x))`∈N such that x ∈ C` (R,x) ⊆ L(R`,x)∩Y for all ` ∈ N,4 and for
any R∗ ∈ Rn:
(i) if C` (R,x) ⊆ L(R∗
`,x) for all ` ∈ N,t h e nx ∈ F (R∗);
(ii) for each i ∈ N,i fy ∈ Ci (R,x) ⊆ L(R∗
i,y) and Y ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all
` ∈ N\{i},t h e ny ∈ F (R∗);
(iii) if y ∈ Y ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all ` ∈ N,t h e ny ∈ F (R∗).5
3M a i n R e s u l t
Following Saijo (1988), we focus on mechanisms in which each agent reports
her own preference R` ∈ R`, her neighbor’s preference R`+1 ∈ R`+1,a n
outcome x ∈ Y ⊆ X and an integer ¦ ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 1.A m e c h a n i s m γ =( M,g) is s-mechanism if, for any ` ∈ N,
M` ≡ R` ×R `+1 × Y × N,w h e r eY ⊆ X and ` +1=1if ` = n.
Deﬁnition 2.A nS C CF is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism if there
exists an s-mechanism γ =( M,g) such that, for all R ∈ Rn:
i) F (R)=NA(γ,R);a n d
ii) for all x ∈ F (R),i fm` =( R`,R `+1,x,¦) ∈ M` for all ` ∈ N,w i t h`+1 =1
if ` = n,t h e nm ∈ NE(γ,R) and g(m)=x.
In Deﬁnition 2, it is required not only that all F-optimal outcomes coin-
cide with Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game deﬁned by an s-mechanism
for any state of the world, but also that such an s-mechanism satisﬁes forth-
rightness. It was originally introduced in economic environments by Dutta,
Sen, and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani, and Yamto (1996), and it has
desired implications. A mechanism satisfying forthrightness is simple in the
sense that it is easy to compute the outcome of an equilibrium strategy pro-
ﬁle. Moreover, if a mechanism fails to satisfy this condition, it is subject
to information smuggling, that is, the strategy space can be reduced to an
arbitrary smaller dimensional space. Thus, any Nash-implementable SCC
seems to be Nash-implementable by s-mechanisms, while any SCC that is
Nash-implementable by s-mechanisms seems to be Nash-implementable by
a ‘further strategy space reduction mechanism’ like self-relevant mechanisms
4Weak set inclusion is denoted by ⊆.
5We refer to the condition that requires only one of the conditions (i)—(iii) in Condition
μ as Conditions μ(i)—μ(iii) each. Note that Condition μ implies Conditions μ(i)—μ(iii),
but the converse is not true. We use similar conventions below
5(Tatamitani, 2000), unless forthrightness is requested. This indicates that
without forthrightness, there is no legitimate reason for characterizing the
class of Nash-implementable SCCs by s-mechanisms. Hence, forthrightness
should be requested in Deﬁnition 2.
Using the approach developed by Moore and Repullo (1990), we now
introduce a class of conditions, labelled {Condition μs
r}, to characterize Nash
implementability by s-mechanisms. For each r =1 ,...,n−2, let us introduce
the following.
Condition μs
r (for short, μs
r): An SCC F satisﬁes Condition μs
r if there exists
















`,x) for all ` ∈ N,t h e nx ∈ F (R∗);





i,y) and Y ⊆ L(R∗
`,y)
for all ` ∈ N\{i},t h e ny ∈ F (R∗);
(iii) if y ∈ Y ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all ` ∈ N,t h e ny ∈ F (R∗),
(iv) for all ` ∈ N with R∗











Proposition 1. An SCC F on Rn satisﬁes Condition μs
r for each r =
1,...,n− 2 if it is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism.
Proof. Let an SCC F on Rn be Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism.
Let γ =( M,g) be such an s-mechanism. Take any r =1 ,...,n− 2.D e ﬁne
Y ≡ g(M). For all R ∈ Rn and x ∈ F (R),t h e r ee x i s t sa nm ∈ NE(γ,R)
such that g(m)=x and m` =
¡
R`,R `+1,x,k `¢
for all ` ∈ N,b yD e ﬁnition
















Then, for any R0
{`,...,`+r−1} ∈ F−1 ¡
R−{`,...,`+r−1},x
¢

















































6by Deﬁnition 2(ii). Therefore, for any R0



























































⊆ L(R`,x) ∩ Y for all ` ∈ N.M o r e o v e r , F satisﬁes
μs
r(iv) by (1). Next, we show that F satisﬁes Conditions μs
r(i)-μs
r(iii). Take






`,x) for all ` ∈ N. Then, it
follows from (1) that g(M`,m −`) ⊆ L(R∗
`,x) for all ` ∈ N.W e c o n c l u d e
that g(m)=x ∈ NA(γ,R ∗)=F (R∗).H e n c e ,μs
r(i) holds.





i,y) and Y ⊆ L(R∗
`,y)
for all ` ∈ N\{i}. I tf o l l o w sf r o m( 1 )t h a tt h e r ei sa nm∗
{i+1,...,i+r} ∈















= y for some m∗
i ∈ Mi.M o r e -
over, g(M) ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all ` ∈ N\{i}. It follows that y ∈ NA(γ,R ∗)=
F (R∗). Hence, μs
r(ii) holds.
Finally, if y ∈ Y ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all ` ∈ N,t h e ny ∈ g(M) ⊆ L(R∗
`,y)
for all ` ∈ N.T h u s ,t h e r ei sa nm∗ ∈ M such that g(m∗)=y, which implies
that y ∈ NA(γ,R ∗)=F (R∗). Hence, μs
r(iii) holds. We conclude that F
satisﬁes μs.
To prove suﬃciency of Condition μs
r we devise a class of s-mechanims
which are similar but not identical to that used by Saijo (1988). Likely
Saijo’s mechanism, in our s-mechanisms agents make cyclic announcement
of strategies and the preference proﬁle, especially the deviator’s preference
relation, is determined without relying upon the deviator’s announcement.
While the proof of Saijo (1988) exploits in full the information coming from
7the cyclic announcement of strategies, we do not follow this course of action
here as we can make use of the novelty of our Condition μs
r(iv).
Proposition 2. For each r =1 ,...,n− 2, an SCC F on Rn satisfying μs
r
is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism.
Proof. Let γ ≡ (M,g) be an s-mechanism. Suppose that F on Rn satisﬁes
μs






∈ M`,w h e r e` +1=1if ` = n, and where the
announcement of agent ` ∈ N about agent ` +1 ’s preferences is R`
`+1.W e
say that the message proﬁle m ∈ M is:
(i) consistent with R and x if, for all ` ∈ N, R`
` = R
`−1
` = R` and x` = x,
where ` − 1=n if ` =1 ;
(ii) m−i quasi-consistent with x and R,w h e r ei ∈ N,i ff o ra l l` ∈ N, x` = x,
and for all ` ∈ N\{i,i +1 }, R`
` = R
`−1
` = R`, R
i−1
i = Ri, R
i+1
i+1 = Ri+1,a n d
[Ri
i 6= Ri or Ri
i+1 6= Ri+1], where j − 1=n if j =1for j ∈ {i,`};
(iii) m−i consistent with x and R,w h e r ei ∈ N,i ff o ra l l` ∈ N\{i}, x` = x 6=
xi,a n df o ra l l` ∈ N\{i,i+1}, R`
` = R
`−1
` = R`, R
i−1
i = Ri and R
i+1
i+1 = Ri+1,
where j − 1=n if j =1for j ∈ {i,`}.
Deﬁne the outcome function g : M → X as follows: For any m ∈ M,
Rule 1: m is consistent with x and ¯ R ∈ Rn,w h e r ex ∈ F
¡ ¯ R
¢
,t h e ng(m)=x.




,t h e ng(m)=x.







6= Y ,w i t hi +1=1if i = n,t h e n
g(m)=
½








Since F satisﬁes μs
r, it follows that, for any R ∈ Rn and any x ∈ F (R),
x ∈ Y . We show that γ =( M,g) Nash-implements F.T a k ea n yR ∈ Rn.
To show that F (R) ⊆ NA(γ,R),l e tx ∈ F (R) and suppose that, for all
` ∈ N, m` =( R`,R `+1,x,¦),w h e r e¦ ∈ N is an arbitrary agent index. Rule
1 implies that g(m)=x. By the deﬁnition of g we have that any deviation




,s ot h a t
6If the remainder is zero the winner of the game is agent n.









it follows that such deviations are not proﬁtable, and so m ∈ NE(γ,R).
Furthermore, this guarantees the condition of Deﬁnition 2(ii).
Conversely, to show that NA(γ,R) ⊆ F (R),l e tm ∈ NE(γ,R).C o n -
sider the following cases.
Case 1: m falls into Rule 1.
Then, m is consistent with x and ¯ R ∈ Rn,w h e r ex ∈ F
¡ ¯ R
¢
.T h u s ,
g(m)=x.T a k ea n y` ∈ N. Suppose that C`
¡ ¯ R−{`+1,...,`+k},x
¢












agent ` can obtain y = g(m∗












L(R`,x) for all ` ∈ N. μs
r(i) implies x ∈ F (R).
Case 2: m falls into Rule 2.




Thus, g(m)=x. We proceed according the following sub-cases: 1) Ri
i 6= ¯ Ri
and Ri
i+1 6= ¯ Ri+1,a n d2 )Ri
i 6= ¯ Ri and Ri
i+1 = ¯ Ri+1.7
Sub-case 2.1. Ri
i 6= ¯ Ri and Ri
i+1 6= ¯ Ri+1
As any ` ∈ N\{i} can attain any y ∈ Y \{x} by inducing Rule 4




\{x}.S u p p o s et h a tCi
¡ ¯ R−{i+1,...,i+r},x
¢
6= Y . By chang-







∈ Mi,a g e n ti can obtain y = g(m∗
i,m −i),
via Rule 3.I n t h e c a s e t h a t Ci
¡ ¯ R−{i,i+1},x
¢







∈ Mi,a g e n ti can attain y = g(m∗
i,m −i) with ap-







⊆ L(Ri,x) as m ∈ NE(γ,R).E i t h e r μs
r(ii)
or μs
r(iii) implies x ∈ F (R).
Sub-case 2.2. Ri
i 6= ¯ Ri and Ri
i+1 = ¯ Ri+1
Let Ri
i = R0
i. We distinguish whether x ∈ F
¡ ¯ R0¢
where ¯ R0 ≡
¡ ¯ R−i,R 0
i
¢
or not. Suppose that x/ ∈ F
¡ ¯ R0¢
. Then the same reasoning used above
for sub-case 2.1 carries over into this sub-case so that x ∈ F (R). Other-
wise, let x ∈ F
¡ ¯ R0¢
. Then, i − 1 or i is the potential deviator. Agent
` ∈ N\{i − 1,i} can attain any y ∈ Y \{x} by inducing Rule 4 so that
x ∈ maxR` Y as m ∈ NE(γ,R). Consider agent i − 1.N o t e t h a t , b y
7The sub-case Ri
i = ¯ Ri and Ri
i+1 6= ¯ Ri+1 is not explicitly considered as it can be proved






































via Rule 3. In the case
that y ∈ Ci−1
¡ ¯ R−{i,...,i+r−1},x
¢




















⊆ L(Ri−1,x) as m ∈ NE(γ,R).C o n s i d e ra g e n ti.A g a i n ,
take any y ∈ Ci
¡ ¯ R−{i+1,...,i+r},x
¢











∈ Mi,a g e n ti can obtain y =
g(m∗










∈ Mi,a g e n ti can attain y =
g(m∗




g(Mi,m −i) ⊆ L(Ri,x) as m ∈ NE(γ,R). Therefore, x ∈ F (R) by μs
r(i).
Case 3: m falls into Rule 3.
Then m is m−i consistent with x and ¯ R ∈ Rn,w h e r ex ∈ F
¡ ¯ R
¢








g(Mi,m −i).F o ra n yxi ∈ Ci
¡ ¯ R−{i+1,...,i+r},x
¢








Then, Rule 3 implies that g(m−i,m ∗
i)=xi. On the other hand, to attain x
agent i can induce Rule 1 by changing mi to m∗
i =








Next, we claim that g(M`,m −`)=Y for any ` ∈ N\{i}. We proceed
according to whether #Y =2and n =3or not.
Sub-case 3.1. not[#Y =2and n =3 ]
Take any ` ∈ N\{i}. Suppose that #Y> 2.B y t h e d e ﬁnition of g,
we have that Y ⊆ g(M`,m −`) for any ` ∈ N\{i}.O t h e r w i s e ,l e t#Y =2 .
Then, n>3. Changing x to x` = xi,a g e n t` can make #
©





` ∈ N|x` 6= x
ª
≥ 2. As the outcome is determined by Rule 4,a g e n t
` can attain any outcome in Y by appropriately choosing k`.T h e r e f o r e ,
Y ⊆ g(M`,m −`) for any ` ∈ N\{i}.
Sub-case 3.2. #Y =2and n =3
Then, let N = {i − 1,i,i+1 } with i +1=1if i = n and i − 1=n if
i =1 .A s Ci
¡ ¯ R−{i+1,...,i+r},x
¢
6= Y it follows that g(m)=x. We proceed
a c c o r d i n gt ow h e t h e rf o rs o m ea g e n t s`,`0 ∈ N,w i t h` 6= `0, #R` 6=1and
#R`0 6=1or not.
Sub-sub-case 3.2.1. For some `,`0 ∈ N,w i t h` 6= `0, #R` 6=1and #R`0 6=1
10In this case, agent i−1 (resp., i+1) can always induce the modulo game
by appropriately changing the announcement of her own preference or that of
her successor and by carefully choosing the outcome announcement. Finally,
to attain xi,a g e n ti−1 (resp., i+1) has only to adjust the integer index so
that agent i becomes the winner of the modulo game.
Sub-sub-case 3.2.2. For all `,`0 ∈ N,w i t h` 6= `0, #R` =1or #R`0 =1
Suppose that, for all `∗ ∈ {i − 1,i,i+1 }, #R`∗ =1 .A s m falls into
Rule 3, it follows that x ∈ F (R)=F
¡ ¯ R
¢
. Otherwise, let us consider the
case that, for some `∗ ∈ {i − 1,i,i+1 }, #R`∗ 6=1 .I fe i t h e r#Ri−1 > 1 or






i−1, ¯ Ri,x,k i−1¢
with R
i−1









i (if #Ri > 1). To at-









.T h e n , l e t #Ri−1 =
#Ri =1 .A g e n t i − 1 can change mi−1 into m∗
i−1 =
¡ ¯ Ri−1, ¯ Ri,x i,ki−1¢
.
Suppose that xi / ∈ F
¡ ¯ Ri−1, ¯ Ri,R i
i+1
¢
. Then, Rule 4 applies and agent i − 1





wise, let xi ∈ F




¡ ¯ Ri,R i
i+1,x i¢






= xi. In the case that Ci+1
¡ ¯ Ri,R i
i+1,x i¢
= Y ,t h eo u t c o m e
is determined by Rule 4, so that by adjusting ki−1 agent i− 1 can attain xi.
By similar reasoning, it can be shown that agent i +1can attain xi ∈ Y .
Therefore, Y ⊆ g(M`,m −`) for ` ∈ {i − 1,i+1 }.
In all the above sub-cases, we obtained Y ⊆ g(M`,m −`) for all ` ∈ N\{i}.




g(m) ∈ maxR` Y for any ` ∈ N\{i},s ot h a tg(m) ∈ F (R) by μs
r(ii).
Case 4: m falls into Rule 4.
Then, Y ⊆ g(M`,m −`) for all ` ∈ N.S i n c e m ∈ NE(γ,R), it follows
that g(m) ∈ maxR` Y for ` ∈ N.T h e r e f o r e ,g(m) ∈ F (R) by μs
r(iii).
From the above propositions, we obtain the following main result.
Theorem 1. An SCC F on Rn is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism
if and only if it satisﬁes Condition μs
r for each r =1 ,...,n− 2.
Furthermore, we can see that the class of SCCs Nash-implementable by s-
mechanisms is not a proper subset of the class of Nash-implementable SCCs.
Lemma 1. Let F be an SCC deﬁned on Rn. Then, for each r =1 ,...,n−2,
Condition μs
r is equivalent to Condition μ.
11Proof. Take any r =1 ,...,n− 2.L e tF on Rn be an SCC satisfying Con-
dition μs
r. Then, F is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism via Theorem
1. Therefore, it is Nash-implementable. By Moore and Repullo (1990)’s re-
sult, it follows that F satisﬁes Condition μ. Conversely, let F be an SCC























We prove that F satisﬁes μs
r.L e t Y = g(M). Moreover, take any R ∈










M o r e o v e r ,i tf o l l o w sf r o m( 2 )t h a tF satisﬁes μs
r(iv). Next, we show that F
meets μs
r(i)-μs






`,x) for all ` ∈ N.S i n c e x ∈ F (R),i t




for all ` ∈ N.
Then, μ(i) implies that x ∈ F (R∗),a sw es o u g h t . T h e r e f o r e ,μs
r(i) holds.





i,y) for some i ∈ N and Y ⊆ L(R∗
`,y)




,i tf o l l o w sf r o m( 2 )a n dμ













{i+1,...,i+r} ∈ F−1 ¡
R−{i+1,...,i+r},x
¢
. Then, μ(ii) implies that y ∈ F (R∗).
Thus, μs
r(ii) is satisﬁed. Let y ∈ Y ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all ` ∈ N. Then, μ(iii)
implies that y ∈ F (R∗),a n ds oμs
r(iii) is met. We conclude that F satisﬁes
μs
r if it satisﬁes μ.
From Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, the following corollaries are easily obtained.
Corollary 1. An SCC F on Rn is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism
if and only if it is Nash-implementable.
Corollary 2. An SCC F on Rn is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism
if and only if it satisﬁes Condition μ.
Note that we can also show that for any intermediate strategy space reduc-
tion mechanism between the canonical and the s-mechanisms, Nash imple-
mentation by such an intermediate one is equivalent to Nash implementation.
Indeed, let us consider any intermediate strategy space reduction mechanism,
say q-mechanism, with the strategy space M` ≡ R`×R`+1×...×R`+q×Y ×N
12for all ` ∈ N,w h e r eq =2 ,...,n− 2.8 Then, it can be shown by a similar
way to the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, that an SCC satisﬁes Condition
μs
r for each r = q,q +1 ,...,n− 2 if and only if it is Nash-implementable
by q-mechanisms. Thus, because of Lemma 1, for each q =2 ,...,n− 2,
an SCC is Nash-implementable by q-mechanisms if and only if it is Nash-
implementable.
4 An alternative characterization
Using the approach developed by Moore and Repullo (1990), we now intro-
duce an alternative condition, labelled Condition Ms,t oc h a r a c t e r i z ei m p l e -
mentability by s-mechanisms. The condition can be stated as follows.
Condition Ms (for short, Ms). An SCC F satisﬁes Ms if there exists a set
Z ⊆ X,a n df o ra l lR ∈ Rn and for all x ∈ F (R), there is a proﬁle of sets
(C∗
` (R`,x))`∈N such that x ∈ C∗
` (R`,x) ⊆ L(R`,x) ∩ Z for all ` ∈ N;a n d
for all R∗ ∈ Rn:
(i) if C∗
` (R`,x) ⊆ L(R∗
`,x) for all ` ∈ N,t h e nx ∈ F (R∗);
(ii) for all i ∈ N,i fy ∈ C∗
i (Ri,x) ⊆ L(R∗
i,y) and Z ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all
` ∈ N\{i},t h e ny ∈ F (R∗);
(iii) if y ∈ Z ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all ` ∈ N,t h e ny ∈ F (R∗).






`∈N introduced in Condition
μs
r, the above condition introduces the proﬁle (C∗
` (R`,x))`∈N which corre-













`∈N we also show that (C∗
` (R`,x))`∈N is well-
deﬁned and can be constructed by using the proﬁle (C` (R,x))`∈N given in
Condition μ. Note that the proﬁle (C∗
` (R`,x))`∈N is similar to the proﬁle of
Condition M devised by Sjöstrom (1991). Finally, we show that Condition
Ms is equivalent to Condition μs
r.
Before stating our next result, it may be worth mentioning here that
Condition Ms do not include any condition of type of Condition μs
r(iv). For
this reason - and in contrast to the proof of Proposition 2-, the proof of
suﬃciency of Condition Ms exploits in full the information coming from the
8A c c o r d i n gt ot h i st e r m i n o l o g y ,q =1corresponds to s-mechanisms while q = n − 1
corresponds to canonical mechanisms. Both of the cases are excluded from the naming of
q-mechanisms, since we are interested in intermediate strategy space reduction solely.
9The deﬁnition of Condition μs
r excludes this case.
13cyclic announcement of strategies. This is done by constructing a mechanism
w h i c ht u r nt ob ed i ﬀerent from the one designed in Proposition 2. Note that
the next result can be shown without imposing forthrightness.
Theorem 2. An SCC F on Rn satisﬁes Ms i fa n do n l yi fi ti sNash-
implementable by an s-mechanism.
Proof. Since the necessity of Condition Ms can be easily obtained by fol-
lowing the proof of the necessity of Condition μ given by Moore and Repullo
(1990) we omit it here.
Conversely, suppose that F satisﬁes Condition Ms.W e s h o w t h a t F is
Nash-implementable via an s-mechanism. For, deﬁne the outcome function
g as in Proposition 2 where Rule 3 is replaced by the following one:











6= Z,w i t hi − 1=n if i =1 ,t h e n
g(m)=
½








The proof follows the same arguments as those provided in the proof of
Proposition 2 except for the sub-case 2.2,i nw h i c ht h ec a s ex ∈ F
¡ ¯ R0¢
is
considered. Therefore, we provide only the proof of this sub-case while we
omit all others here.
Suppose that m ∈ NE(γ,R) and m falls into Rule 2 such that Ri
i 6= ¯ Ri
and Ri
i+1 = ¯ Ri+1.L e tRi
i = R0
i and x ∈ F
¡ ¯ R0¢
where ¯ R0 ≡




i − 1 or i is the deviator. Agent ` ∈ N\{i − 1,i} can attain any y ∈ Z\{x}
by inducing Rule 4,s ot h a tx ∈ maxR` Z as m ∈ NE(γ,R).C o n s i d e r


















































with appropriately choosing ki−1.





































∈ Mi,a g e n ti can obtain y = g(m∗
i,m −i) via Rule 3.











Mi,a g e n ti can attain y = g(m∗









⊆ L(Ri,x) as m ∈
NE(γ,R). Therefore, x ∈ F (R) by Ms(i). This completes the proof.
14Lemma 2. Let F be an SCC deﬁned on Rn.T h e n , Condition Ms is
equivalent to Condition μ.
Proof. Let F on Rn be an SCC. First, suppose that F satisﬁes Ms. Then,
by Theorem 2, F is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism, and so it is
Nash-implementable. By Moore and Repullo (1990)’s result it follows that
F satisﬁes μ. Conversely, suppose that F satisﬁes μ. Then, F is Nash-















−` ≡ R1 ×...×R `−1 ×R `+1 ×...×R n.F o ra n y` ∈ N, R ∈ Rn and
x ∈ F (R),d e ﬁne the set C∗
` (R`,x) as follows
C
∗










We prove that F satisﬁes Ms.L e tZ = Y . Moreover, take any R ∈ Rn and
x ∈ F (R).I tf o l l o w sf r o m( 3 )a n dμ that, for each ` ∈ N, x ∈ C∗
` (R`,x) ⊆
L(R`,x) ∩ Z and C∗
` (R`,x) is well-deﬁned. Next, we show that F meets
Ms(i)-Ms(iii). For, take any R∗ ∈ Rn.
Let C∗
` (R`,x) ⊆ L(R∗
`,x) for all ` ∈ N.S i n c ex ∈ F (R), it follows from
μ and (3) that C` (R,x) ⊆ C∗
` (R`,x) for all ` ∈ N. Then, μ(i) implies that
x ∈ F (R∗),a sw es o u g h t .T h u s ,Ms(i) holds. Let y ∈ C∗
i (Ri,x) ⊆ L(R∗
i,y)
for some i ∈ N and Z ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all ` ∈ N\{i}.A s y ∈ C∗
i (Ri,x),






i (Ri,x) for some
R0
−i ∈ F−1 (Ri,x). Then, μ(ii) implies that y ∈ F (R∗).T h u s , Ms(ii) is
satisﬁed. Let y ∈ Z ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all ` ∈ N. Then, μ(iii) implies that
y ∈ F (R∗),a n ds oMs(iii) holds. We conclude that F satisﬁes Ms if it
satisﬁes Condition μ.
Form Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 the corollary stated below is readily ob-
tained.
Corollary 3. Let F be an SCC deﬁned on Rn.T h e n , Condition Ms is
equivalent to Condition μs.
155 Characterizing s-Mechanisms as the Lower-
Bound Strategy Space Reduction Mecha-
nisms
The last two sections show that the ‘strategy space reduction’ from the canon-
ical mechanisms up to s-mechanisms does not make any eﬀect on the class
of Nash implementable SCCs. The purpose of this section is to show that
such a property can no longer hold if a further step of the ‘strategy space
reduction’ is taken. Indeed, if the self-relevant mechanism deﬁn e di nT a t a m i -
tani (2000) is taken as a further step of the strategy space reduction from
s-mechanisms, it can be shown that the class of Nash-implementable SCCs
by self-relevant mechanisms is a proper subset of the class of Nash imple-
mentable SCCs. However, there is another type of further strategy space
r e d u c t i o nt h a ti sr e l e v a n tf o rt h ei s s u ea th a n d .I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w ec o n s i d e r
a strategy space reduction mechanism in which each agent reveals only her
neighbor’s preferences in addition to an outcome and an integer (neighbor’s
preference mechanism, np-mechanism) and examine the cost of using this
kind of mechanisms on implementability of SCCs.
Deﬁnition 3.A m e c h a n i s m γ =( M,g) is neighbor’s preference mechanism
(np-mechanism) if, for any ` ∈ N, M` ≡ R`+1 × Y × N,w h e r eY ⊆ X and
` +1=1if ` = n.
Deﬁnition 4.A nS C CF is Nash-implementable by an np-mechanism if there
exists an np-mechanism γ =( M,g) such that, for all R ∈ Rn:
i) F (R)=NA(γ,R);a n d
ii) for all x ∈ F (R),i fm` =( R`+1,x,¦) ∈ M` for all ` ∈ N,w i t h` +1=1
if ` = n,t h e nm ∈ NE(γ,R) and g(m)=x.
Using the approach developed by Moore and Repullo (1990), we now in-
troduce a condition, Condition μnp, which turns out to be necessary for SCCs
that are implementable by np- m e c h a n i s m si nt h et h r e eo rm o r ea g e n t sc a s e .
Before describing the condition and prove its necessity, we need addition nota-
tion. Given (R,x) ∈ Rn×X,d e ﬁne D(R,x) ≡
©






The condition is stated as follows.
Condition μnp (for short, μnp): An SCC F satisﬁes Condition μnp if there


















`,x) for all ` ∈ N,t h e nx ∈ F (R∗);





i,y) and Y ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all
` ∈ N\{i},t h e ny ∈ F (R∗);
(iii) if y ∈ Y ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all ` ∈ N,t h e ny ∈ F (R∗),
(iv) for all ` ∈ N with R∗











(v) if x/ ∈ F (R∗) and D(R∗,x) 6= ∅, then there exists an outcome p(R∗,x) ∈
X such that:





for any ` ∈ D(R∗,x);a n d






i ,p(R∗,x)) for all i ∈
D(R∗,x),a n dY ⊆ L(R∗∗
` ,p(R∗,x)) for all ` ∈ N\D(R∗,x),t h e np(R∗,x) ∈
F (R∗∗).
Proposition 3. An SCC F on Rn satisﬁes Condition μnp if it is Nash-
implementable by an np-mechanism.
Proof. Let an SCC F on Rn be Nash-implementable by an np-mechanism.
Let γ =( M,g) be such an np-mechanism. Deﬁne Y ≡ g(M).F o r a l l




for all ` ∈ N,b yD e ﬁnition 4(ii). Take any ` ∈ N.
For any R0
`+1 ∈ F−1 ¡
R−{`+1},x
¢














,b yD e ﬁnition 4(ii). Thus, for any
R0
`+1 ∈ F−1 ¡
R−{`+1},x
¢
, g(M`,m −`) ⊆ L(R`,x).M o r e o v e r ,g(m0
`,m −`)=
x ∈ NA(γ,R) also holds for any R0

















L(R`,x) ∩ Y .M o r e o v e r , f o r a n y R∗ ∈ Rn with R∗
−{`+1} = R−{`+1} and










,t h u sF satisﬁes μnp(iv).












≡ g(M`,m −`) that g(M`,m −`) ⊆ L(R∗
`,x) for all ` ∈
N.W ec o n c l u d et h a tg(m)=x ∈ NA(γ,R ∗)=F (R∗). Hence, μnp(i) holds.





i,y) and Y ⊆ L(R∗
`,y)




≡ g(Mi,m −i) that y ∈
g(Mi,m −i).M o r e o v e r ,g(M) ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all ` ∈ N\{i}. It follows that
y ∈ NA(γ,R ∗)=F (R∗). Hence, μnp(ii) holds.
If y ∈ Y ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all ` ∈ N,t h e ny ∈ g(M) ⊆ L(R∗
`,y) for all
` ∈ N. Thus, there is an m∗ ∈ M such that g(m∗)=y, which implies that
y ∈ NA(γ,R ∗)=F (R∗). Hence, μnp(iii) holds.






∈ M` for all ` ∈ N.L e tp(R∗,x) ≡ g(m∗).C o n -
































for all ` ∈ N,
where m0
` = m∗





.A s i t h o l d s f o r

















i ,p(R∗,x)) for all i ∈
D(R∗,x) and Y ⊆ L(R∗∗







i ,g(m∗)) for all i ∈ D(R∗,x) and g(M) ⊆ L(R∗∗
` ,g(m∗))
for all ` ∈ N\D(R∗,x) it follows that p(R∗,x)=g(m∗) ∈ NA(γ,R ∗∗)=
F (R∗∗).T h u s ,μnp( v )h o l d s .W ec o n c l u d et h a tF satisﬁes μnp.
The above proposition implies that Nash implementation by an np-mechanism
is no equivalent to Nash implementation, since the existence of the punish-
ment condition, Condition μnp(v), makes Condition μnp stronger than Con-
dition μ. That is, Condition μnp implies Condition μ,b u tt h ec o n v e r s e
does not hold. Therefore, Proposition 3 implies that the class of Nash-
implementable SCCs by np-mechanisms is a proper subset of the class of
Nash-implementable SCCs.10 Moreover, combined with the characterization
result of Nash implementation by self-relevant mechanisms in Tatamitani
(2000), Proposition 3 indicates that no more ‘strategy-space-reduction mech-
anisms’ than s-mechanisms can preserve the Moore and Repullo (1990) full
characterization of Nash implementation. In other words, the class of s-
mechanisms represents the lower-bound of ‘mechanisms with strategy space
10To see it, for instance, consider classical economic environments as the domain of
SCCs. Then, as shown in Saijo, Tatamitani, and Yamato (1999), the no-envy and eﬃcient
correspondence does not satisfy μnp-(v), though it satisﬁes μ.
18reduction’ which can work for Nash implementation of the class of SCCs
satisfying Condition μ.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we deal with the informational eﬃciency issue pertaining to
Maskin’s Theorem (Maskin, 1999). We focus on s-mechanisms in which each
agent reports to the planner her own preference and her neighbor’s preference
solely, in addition to a feasible social outcome and an integer. We introduce
a class of new conditions, labelled {Condition μs
r}r=1,...,n−2,e a c ho fw h i c h
fully characterizes the class of SCCs Nash-implemantable by s-mechanisms.
Surprisingly, for each r =1 ,...,n−2,C o n d i t i o nμs
r is equivalent to Condition
μ. This has two important implications for Nash implementation. First, the
class of Nash-implementable SCCs is equivalent to the class of SCCs Nash-
implementable by s-mechanisms. Second, even though our condition is stated
in terms of the existence of certain sets, it can easily be checked in practice
by the algorithm provided by Sjöström (1991).
Note that our results are in line with other well known results of Nash
implementation in economic environments. In particular, the equivalent rela-
tionship between Nash implementation by s-mechanism and Nash implemen-
tation in general social choice environments is analogous to the equivalent
relationship between Nash implementation by natural allocation mechanisms
and Nash implementation by natural quantity2 mechanisms (Saijo et al,
1996). Moreover, Tatamitani (2001) provides a full characterization of Nash
implementation by self-relevant mechanisms, which together with Proposi-
tion 3 in this paper indicates that any further ‘strategy space reduction’ from
s-mechanisms drastically decreases the class of Nash-implementable SCCs.
This is parallel to the case of natural implementation in economic environ-
ments, in which the class of SCCs Nash-implementable by natural quantity
mechanisms is much smaller than the Nash-implementable ones by natural
quantity2 mechanisms.
In contrast, whenever a small departure from the standard framework of
implementation theory is considered the above relationship may break down.
For example, Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009) introduce the
notion of partial honesty in implementation theory and consider Nash imple-
mentation problems with partially-honest agents. A partially-honest agent is
an agent who has preferences over message proﬁles and displays concerns for
19two dimensions in lexicographic order: (1) her outcome and (2) her truth-
telling behavior. In the presence of partially honest agents, the equivalent
relationship between Nash implementation and Nash implementation by s-
mechanisms no longer holds, as Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011) show. This
suggests that the equivalent relationship indispensably relies on the assump-
tion that agents act purely to advance their own self-interest and are not
inclined to attach (moral) rights and duties to their actions.
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